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Non-governmental organisations and the rule of law:  
The experience of Latin America 
 
Dr Fiona Macaulay 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The rule of law, that is, the fair, competent, effective, and predictable 
application of laws that enhance, rather than undermine, social accountability 
and fundamental human rights, is a core function of the state, and forms part 
of its social contract with the citizenry. However, ensuring that a government 
upholds the rule of law requires a number of checks and balances. Some of 
this accountability and enforcement function lies with the other branches of 
government: oversight of the executive by the legislative branch through its 
committees and reports, and by the judiciary, which has its own proactive 
powers and can be petitioned by citizens and their representatives. But this 
republican structure can still be unresponsive or resistant to scrutiny, 
particularly when elites across the branches of government are indifferent to, 
or collude in, maintaining chronic problems in the justice system. Active non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are therefore recognised as a crucial 
component in the effective application of the rule of law due to their 
independence from government and their often-different perspective on the 
impact of unevenly applied and unjust laws and law enforcement through 
direct contact with the victims of arbitrary treatment. This chapter explores 
ways in which NGOs (both international and local) can contribute to 
strengthening rule of law through a case study of how the Open Society 
Institute and its Justice Initiative (OSJI) and a network of Brazilian NGOs 
developed a campaign to reduce the excessive use of pre-trial detention.  
 
 
It demonstrates how NGOs can fulfil important watchdog functions and are 
able to change laws, policies and practices that significantly improve the rule 
of law by working strategically with one another, with international partners 
and with sympathetic state actors. 
 
NGOs AND RULE OF LAW 
 
Non-government organisations have diverse roots: many spring from informal 
civil society movements in which actors at some point decide to set up a 
professionalised, institutionalised bureaucracy to order to be more effective in 
pursuing their goals; legally-focussed NGOs often emerge from human rights 
and pro-democracy movements. However, the presence of external actors 
offering incentives, such as funding, can also provide the impetus for the 
creation of such NGOs. Rule of law and justice sector reform has been a 
component of democracy promotion since the 1990s, and some NGOs were 
set up specifically in order to deliver this global reform agenda. These mixed 
origins result in a diversity of NGOs, some oriented more to mobilisation and 
protest and others to legislative and institutional change. In practice NGOs 
often take on a number of different functions, discretely, in sequence or in 
tandem. These include: direct provision of justice services, either in 
substitution of, or co-production with, the state, for example, pro-bono work for 
individuals lacking legal counsel; interventions in pivotal cases through 
amicus curiae briefs; public interest litigation challenging the government on 
bad laws, poor legal decisions, or constitutional violations; research and 
public awareness work (around rights, deficits in the rule of law and their 
social consequences); and policy advocacy work (lobbying for reforms to laws 
and practices).1 These NGOs tend to be relatively small in comparison to 
other law-related civil society organisations such as Bar Associations, but on 
whose backing or individual members they may draw. They may also be 
heavily reliant on funding from state sources (when contracted to carry out 
research or provide legal services) or from international funders; inter-
governmental organisations tend to fund research and service provision, 
whereas international non-governmental organisations have greater latitude to 
fund advocacy in pursuit of structural change. However, their degree of 
                                                 
1 On the role of Latin American civil society in social accountability see 
Perruzotti and Smulovitz (2006). 
leverage or effectiveness lies not in their size, but in the ways that they can 
work with both international actors (inter-governmental and non-
governmental) and local state actors to find opportunities and spaces within 
which to press their reform agenda. 
 
PROMOTING RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
From ‘law and development’ to human rights and governance: 1960s-1980s 
 
International NGO (INGO) interest in the rule of law in Latin America dates 
back to the 1960s. A number of large US philanthropic organisations were 
engaged in development assistance to Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
promoting economic growth, human capital formation through public sector 
investment, and state-building through project planning and management.2 
State-building framed how the Ford Foundation and other US-based 
institutions supported legal reform activities in Latin America as part of the 
‘law and development movement’. They assumed that lawyers trained along 
North American lines would provide a bedrock of legal competence that would 
facilitate domestic and foreign private investment, and thus reduce poverty. 
However, the results were disappointing, as the imposed liberal, common law, 
model failed to mesh with local, civil law, cultures. The rule of law was also 
not yet seen as entailing the protection of human rights and citizens’ voice in 
decision-making. However, the 1964 military coup in Brazil, and subsequent 
installation of other prolonged authoritarian regimes in Chile (1973), Argentina 
and Uruguay (1976), changed that position, especially for the Ford 
Foundation, whose staff increasingly argued a moral duty to promote human 
rights as a keystone of democracy. It switched its funding from government 
agencies to local think-tanks, NGOs, and civil society/activist organisations, 
and to the nascent Human Rights Watch. Having tested its support for human 
rights-centred rule of law in Latin America, the Foundation then extended its 
                                                 
2 These include the W.K. Kellogg, Tinker and Rockefeller Foundations, the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Carnegie Corporation. However, the Ford 
Foundation dwarfed them all in the scope, range, and size of its funding, 
giving grants worth US$61.7m to developing regions between 1950-1961 
(Kiger 2000: 132). 
new approach to its programmes in the Middle East and Africa, assisting the 
end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. By 1981, the Ford Foundation’s 
new programme structure made ‘human rights and governance’ one of its four 
major units, with the view that governments should be responsive to their 
citizens, who in turn need the tools to demand accountability (Alliance 
Magazine 2009; Frühling 2000; Carmichael 2001). Its work was ground-
breaking both in supporting a culture of NGOs working on rule of law related 
matters in developing and democratising regions, and in demonstrating the 
power of INGOs in framing debates and supporting local civil society networks 
to achieve concrete changes. 
 
(Re)democratisation: 1980s-1990s 
 
Several Latin American countries made the transition from authoritarian and 
military rule to democracy after the mid-1980s. Human rights NGOs, such as 
the Centre for Legal and Social Studies in Argentina and the Legal Defence 
Institute in Peru, which had been documenting the arbitrary abuses and 
supporting the victims of the military regimes, gradually moved away from 
pursuing justice for past violations towards a more agenda-setting and public 
litigation role around the continuing weaknesses of the justice system 
(Frühling 2001; Shifter 2001). The 1996 peace agreement in El Salvador 
prompted the establishment of the Due Process of Law Foundation, based in 
Washington DC, to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
with an emphasis on empowering civil society’s voice in any reforms. 
 
However, the inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), such as the World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, promoting judicial reform in 
transitional countries initially took a narrow, top-down, and state-centric 
approach that promoted a ‘cookie-cutter’ set of reforms, applied in every 
country regardless of local specificities and ‘fit’. These packages typically 
involved rewriting laws and codes, training programmes for legal 
professionals, technology assistance (computerisation of court processes and 
records) and refurbishing courthouses, and institutional development (Alkon, 
2002). They focused mainly on court efficiency, quality, and political 
independence (Domingo and Sieder 2001; Hammergren 2008). Access to 
justice initiatives such as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were 
designed at first to address commercial disputes in order to attract foreign 
investors. However, some forms of community conflict resolution and 
mediation were developed as a means of increasing the legitimacy of the 
democratic state and reducing social violence. These were sometimes 
delivered by human rights and legal NGOs acting as co-producers of the rule 
of law for the most marginalised communities, for example, through the 
Balcão de Direitos legal aid centres set up in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro 
between 1996-2005 by the NGO Viva Rio. 
 
Criminal justice reform was lower down the agenda of the multilateral donors 
as the control of crime and violence was regarded as a matter of state 
security and thus politically sensitive. Procedural code reform – such as the 
switch from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system - was seen as more 
technical and easier to achieve than penal code reform, which often fell victim 
to penal populism. The United States, the major bilateral donor in the region, 
had a paradoxical impact. On the one hand, it promoted judicial and police 
reform, and the strengthening of accountability mechanisms such as 
ombudsman’s and human rights offices. Yet it also demanded tougher police 
action and mandatory remand and custodial sentences as part of its War on 
Drugs (Transnational Institute and Washington Office on Latin America, 
2011). It was thus partly responsible both directly – through conditionality in its 
funding to countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico (and indirectly 
through its creation of a moral panic on drugs) for the region-wide explosion in 
the prison population, this focus on punishment also reflected the orthodoxy in 
parts of the UN system, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime. So, the task of reversing the flow of prisoners into the system fell to 
NGOs and INGOs. 
 
MASS INCARCERATION AS A RULE OF LAW PROBLEM 
 
The post-authoritarian and post-conflict criminal justice systems of the region 
began to be tested from the 1990s by a surge in crime and violence, much of 
it linked to the increased trafficking of illegal narcotics and related 
contrabands, and to the emergence of criminal networks and street gangs in 
some countries. Although this was concentrated in certain countries and 
urban centres, a common response was expanded punitivism and penal 
inflation: in Brazil in the 30-year period 1985-2016 115 crime-related laws 
were passed, putting around 550 new offences on the statute books.3 Police 
arrested more people, due to both increased efficiency and institutional 
incentives, whilst the judiciary and wider society backed imprisonment as the 
preferred form of punishment, particularly for the young, non-white male 
population regarded as a social threat. Every country thus saw a rise in 
incarceration in terms of absolute numbers, and in the rate of imprisonment. 
Some experienced a four-to-five- fold rise in the two decades since the first 
half of the1990s: El Salvador’s incarceration rate shot up from 99 to 509 per 
100,000 population; Brazil’s went from 74 to 301.  
 
 
Whereas imprisonment as a form of legal and legitimate punishment of 
offenders that threaten the rights of others could be understood as fulfilling the 
rule of law, such mass incarceration (especially with high levels of pretrial 
detention) ends up undermining the rule of law in a number of dimensions: 
denial of due process, equality before the law and the presumption of 
innocence; arbitrary and illegal detention, violation of the right to liberty and 
other human rights, and an erosion of the state’s monopoly on force. Across 
Latin America prisoner numbers quickly outstripped capacity, leading to 
serious overcrowding, inhuman and degrading conditions of detention, torture, 
excessive force, and collective punishment inflicted by staff on prisoners, and 
chaotic violence between inmates. This led first to frequent riots and prison 
breaks, and then to prisoners creating inmate collectives that came to 
constitute parallel forms of governance inside the prisons (Lessing 2010). 
Brazil’s major inmate syndicate, the First Capital Command (Primeiro 
Comando da Capital - PCC), was born in the São Paulo prison system and 
now dominates 95 per cent of the facilities in the state, that is, over 225,000 
                                                 
3 http://emporiododireito.com.br/o-excesso-punitivo-e-mais-um-erro-
legislativo/ 
prisoners, or over a third of Brazil’s prison population. It was able to extend its 
trafficking and protection racket operations into low-income neighbourhoods 
thanks to the prison estate providing associational space, infrastructure, and 
new recruits from a revolving door of arrest, detention and release that sent 
one million individuals a year through the prison system (DEPEN 2016: 23). In 
those urban areas, it functioned both in tandem and in competition with the 
police (which it often co-opted or corrupted). Thus, the rule of law and order 
both inside and outside the prison system was privatised by violent non-state 
actors.  
 
 
Where pretrial detention has become the rule, not the exception, it has been a 
major contributor to the problems of mass incarceration, both in the numbers 
of individuals that it places in an overloaded system, and in the corrosion of 
the rule of law, which in turn produce grievances that make inmates turn to 
prisoner collectives and gangs. Often the period of pre-trial detention exceeds 
any reasonable, or legally stipulated, period for the authorities to conclude 
their investigation and preparation of charges. Judges frequently ignore 
official criteria for remand, such as a threat to public order, or risk of 
absconding. Detainees are not given information about the actual charges 
that will be, or have been, brought against them, or when they will eventually 
be brought before a judge for the first time, and are denied access to legal 
counsel. In many cases individuals are held on remand on charges for which 
a custodial sentence could not be imposed, or for a period beyond the 
maximum custodial sentence. Yet, illegal and unjustified pretrial is clearly the 
result of state commission or omission, because whilst 85.9 per cent of 
Bolivia’s prisoners and 79 per cent of Paraguay’s detainees are awaiting trial, 
only 12.3 per cent of Nicaragua’s prisoners and 17.2 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
are on remand. 4  
 
Latin America has the one of the oldest and strongest regional human rights 
system, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has 
                                                 
4 World Prison Brief http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/pre-trial-
detainees?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All accessed on 4 September 2016 
been actively highlighting such excessive pre-trial detention as a major 
concern for over a decade through its periodic inspection visits. The region’s 
history of government human rights abuses and strong civil society responses 
has enabled information-sharing between policy networks of NGOs, 
government officials and international organisations. These factors have 
allowed activists to meet, compare notes, diffuse good practice, and put 
pressure on recalcitrant governments, as the case of custody hearings in 
Brazil demonstrates.  
 
NGO action on detention 
 
Before the 1990s human rights Latin American NGOs focused on the arrest 
and treatment of political detainees and protesters, and did not much consider 
wider structural issues affecting the mass of inmates. But the exploding prison 
population turned the attention of some to the torture of prisoners in police 
custody, excessive use of force by authorities in dealing with prison incidents, 
the denial of healthcare and legal assistance, and the impact of arbitrary and 
prolonged detention on families and communities. Sometimes they provided 
direct services, such as legal assistance, that should be the responsibility of 
the state. They conducted research and handed over documentation on 
systematic rights violations to inspectors from the national authorities and 
from international organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and the Inter-American and United Nations human rights 
bodies. They took key emblematic cases to the domestic courts and then to 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, making full use of what Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) term the ‘boomerang’ strategy of using international 
opprobrium as a lever for changes in domestic policies and practices. 
Increasingly, groups such as the Center for Justice and International Law 
(CEJIL) turned to public interest litigation to force governments to comply with 
their own norms and standards for the treatment of prisoners.  
 
Brazil’s prison population rose 575 per cent in the quarter century from 1990-
2015. Since the return to democracy in the mid-1980s, the Pastoral 
Carcerária (the Catholic Church’s Pastoral service to prisoners) had been 
addressing the immediate welfare of prisoners but more recent mass 
incarceration forced it to begin addressing structural problems with lobbying 
and mobilisation. Newer NGOs founded by individuals - often lawyers - who 
had cut their teeth in the human rights movement of the late 1980s and 1990s 
began to tackle deficits in the operation justice system. For years, many of 
Brazil’s 27 states either had no legal aid service, or had one that was woefully 
understaffed with its lawyers earning considerably less than their prosecutorial 
counterparts (Weis, 2012).5 As a result prisoner typically spent three to six 
months on remand before they received any legal assistance. The Institute for 
the Defence of the Right to Defence (Instituto de Defesa do Direito de Defesa 
– IDDD), founded in 2000 by 35 criminal lawyers in the city of São Paulo, 
began by offering pro bono legal assistance to prisoners through its network 
of volunteer lawyers, carrying out systematic reviews of case files in particular 
prisons (such a collective, focussed effort is called a mutirão carcerário).  
 
Other NGOs formed at the same time in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo with 
research on prisons and assistance to prisoners as their sole or major remit, 
came at the problem from complementary angles, lobbying norm-setters and 
litigating in both national and international fora. The Land, Labor and 
Citizenship Institute (Instituto Terra, Trabalho e Cidadania - ITTC) was 
founded in 1997 in order to combat inequalities and human rights abuses. 
Based in São Paulo it works in particular on women’s issues, including foreign 
nationals, in detention. It conducts research and campaigns on non-custodial 
sentences and drugs and gender issues. Lawyer James Cavallaro left his post 
as Human Rights Watch’s representative in Brazil to set up Global Justice 
(Justiça Global), a human rights research and advocacy organisation, in 1999 
in order to take cases to the Inter-American human rights mechanism as so 
few cases were being submitted concerning Brazil. Conectas was set up in 
2001 by a group of human rights lawyers and activists to promote human 
rights and the consolidation of the rule of law in the Global South through 
training human rights defenders and supporting collaborative networks. In 
Brazil, it specialises in advocacy and public interest litigation. The Association 
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for Prison Reform (Associação pela Reforma Prisional - ARP) was set up in 
2003 as an arm of the Centre for Studies on Security and Citizenship at 
Candido Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro to provide legal assistance to 
prisoners and litigate domestically on prison issues. Both were established by 
Julita Lemgruber, former head of Rio de Janeiro state’s prison system and a 
law-and-order reformer. The Institute of Human Rights Defenders (Instituto de 
Defensores de Direitos Humanos – IDDH), a Rio-based group set up in 2007, 
specializes in legal aid to, and strategic litigation on behalf of, pre-trial 
prisoners. These NGOs would form the heart of the Criminal Justice Network 
set up in conjunction with Open Society to tackle the ‘gateway’ issue of 
pretrial detention as part of a wider campaign on global justice and rule of law 
reform. 
 
OPEN SOCIETY’S APPROACH TO JUSTICE REFORM 
 
Whilst the criminal justice systems in Latin America were coming under strain, 
a new ‘meta-NGO’ was consolidating itself internationally as a policy 
entrepreneur and agenda-setter around the rule of law in transitional 
societies. The Open Society Institute (OSI), established in 1993 by the 
billionaire philanthropist and financier George Soros, is a grant-making 
foundation that serves as the hub of a global network of autonomous Soros 
foundations and organisations in more than 60 countries set up since 1984 
(Stone, 2010). OSI’s explicit mission is to shape public policy to promote 
democratic governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law, health, 
education and youth and media and information. This it aimed to do by 
promoting appropriate economic, social and legal reforms and by supporting 
local level actors, through its cross-border and cross-regional alliances, to 
advocate for, and ensure the enactment of, these reforms. As this case study 
will demonstrate, it was able to reset the terms of debate internationally 
around pretrial detention and work with country-level and community-based 
NGOs to achieve tangible changes in both policy and practice. 6 
                                                 
6 Based on email, skype and face-to face conversations with senior 
programme staff from the Open Society Justice Initiative, and with key 
 The Open Society Justice Initiative, which is a division or endowed NGO 
within the Open Society structure, began its campaign on pretrial detention as 
a component of its wider work on pretrial justice, in which two of its key 
staffers had been closely involved: Zaza Namoradze of the Budapest office 
had been promoting legal aid in Central Europe and community-based 
paralegals in West and South Africa, and Martin Schönteich had been 
researching pretrial detention, noting that over the course of a year, nine 
million people pass through pretrial detention, and three million – that is, one 
third of all people behind bars – are on remand on any given day. In 2010 a 
global campaign on the latter was suggested as a strategic means of 
exposing the wider dysfunction of justice systems. A 12-person core OSJI 
team was assembled from staff in Abuja, Budapest, Brussels, New York, and 
Mexico. In order to create regional networks of NGOs that could work, 
strategise, and build for the long term, they used a snowball technique, 
communicating initially with some 100 known contacts through newsletters. 
Madeleine Crohn, a Brussels-based advocacy officer seconded to the New 
York office and experienced in running big campaigns, assumed that it would 
take up to ten years both to build effective advocacy networks and reframe 
and legitimate the issue with policy-makers. In the event, the Global 
Campaign was projected to last for just three years, with OSJI receiving 
substantial matching funding from the British Department for International 
Development. The latter was then restructured and moved on to other 
priorities, and the Global Campaign ended after five, also due to internal 
restructuring. However, the NGO policy networks it had built in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin American endured, to varying degrees. At a 
country level, in particular, the policy communities continued to function, 
focussed on specific goals, as will be seen in the case of Brazil. 
 
The first move in the Global Campaign was an epistemic one. OSJI produced 
a number of position papers that collated reliable and comprehensive data on 
excessive pretrial detention and identified it as the cause of multiple harms – 
                                                                                                                                            
individuals from the Criminal Justice Network in Brazil, between May and 
September 2016. 
the practice of torture, spread of disease, institutional corruption, family 
poverty, erosion of the rule of law and hence of public confidence and state 
legitimacy – that affect not only the detainees, but also their families, 
communities, and states. This reframed a supposedly criminal justice matter 
as a much broader public governance issue and hence attracted a wider 
group of policy makers (Open Society Foundations, 2014). Their research 
also underscored how abuse of pretrial detention involves violations of both 
procedural, or thin, (rules) and substantive, or thick, (outcomes) aspects of 
rule of law (see the introduction to this volume). Legal system operators 
routinely ignored the legal guidelines, that is, the process values governing 
remand. The OSJI sought to empower a coalition of Brazilian NGOs to work 
with key state actors in order to improve the transparency, predictability, 
enforceability, and stability of the pretrial decision-making process, to make 
the judiciary more accountable and in so doing improve the legitimacy of the 
justice system.  
 
The Brazilian Criminal Justice Network 
 
As the OSJI wanted maximum impact for their campaign they asked a third 
party who knew the key players in the Brazilian NGOs to meet with them 
individually and seed the idea of a network and a common agenda. Those 
that recognised the importance of both the funding on offer and joint work 
were the first to form the network: Conectas, the Church’s prison ministry, and 
Instituto Sou da Paz, which had previously worked more on public security, 
disarmament, and police violence. Others joined later, and the network 
fluctuated between three and ten members.  
 
In February 2010, when the Brazilian Criminal Justice Network was formed, 
the first strategic target was the national legislature, which produces all law on 
penal matters. The three NGOs set up an advocacy project (Projeto Brasília), 
establishing a permanent presence in the country’s capital to track proposed 
justice-related legislation. They soon logged 1,300 bills, classified them in 
terms of their positive or negative impact on substantive rule of law issues, 
and tracked them through the bicameral system. They met with the college of 
party leaders where the weekly legislative agenda is determined, sat in 
committees and floor sessions, and thus identified key players and opinion-
formers. Their work was helped, paradoxically, by the fact that most 
legislators were not used to being lobbied by civil society, which both lacked 
the resources and found it difficult to target a highly fragmented party system 
(23 parties were represented in Congress in 2010) where politicians 
frequently switch parties. In consequence legislators felt ill-prepared on 
criminal justice matters and eagerly took up the statistical data, policy briefs, 
legislative bills proposals and evaluations supplied by the Network’s 
representative and the three NGOs, which built trust, collaboration, and a 
division of labour despite their different histories and mandates (Romanach et 
al 2012).  
 
Many of the bills the network focussed on were regarded as regressive, and 
therefore they sought to block or amend them. In order not to seem negative 
in its agenda, the group selected two bills to promote positively, one of which 
was the Law of Precautionary Measures (Lei de Medidas Cautelares). 
Intended to reduce pretrial detention it gave judges a wider range of 
alternatives to remand or unconditional release of suspects, including house 
arrest, regular reporting in to a court, electronic monitoring, night-curfew at 
home, payment of bails, and bans on specific movement, contacts, and jobs. 
The law had been circulating since 2001, having come out of the 
government’s expert-led review of the Criminal Procedure Code initiated at 
the end of 1999. However, despite this initial executive backing, it had 
languished for a decade. It took a year of discussion for the network to find 
key allies in the Office of Legislative Affairs in the Ministry of Justice who then 
championed the bill. It was approved in April 2011, at a point when Brazil had 
over 215,000 people in pre-trial detention, which accounted for 44% of the 
total prison population. 
 
Judicial blockages and solutions 
 
The implementation of the bill depended on a culture shift among the 
country’s judges who had already been identified responsible for much of the 
prison system’s crisis, having ignored existing legal criteria for pretrial 
detention, and failed to perform their other function of overseeing prison 
sentences. Brazil’s National Justice Council (Conselho Nacional de Justiça – 
CNJ), set up in 2004 as the watchdog arm of the judiciary, started a 
systematic review of prisoner case files in 2008. Whereas the IDDD, as an 
NGO, had relied on volunteer lawyers, as a branch of the judiciary the CNJ 
was able to pass internal ordinances to prosecutors, judges and state legal 
aid lawyers released from normal duties to conduct these ‘mutirões 
carcerários’; a 2009 law institutionalised this function within its structure by 
creating a Department of Prison System Monitoring (Foley, 2012). By 2016 it 
had examined over 400,000 case files, and had arranged for overdue earned 
prison benefits (such as progression to a lighter prison regime, or parole) to 
be awarded to 80,000 inmates, over 45,000 of whom were released from 
prison having in fact served their full term.7 However, the judges responsible 
for these omissions suffered no consequences. Brazilian judges, right down to 
circuit court level, enjoyed too much, rather than too little, individual 
autonomy. Binding precedent was weak, and state-level appeals courts often 
compounded the problem. 
 
Thus it was perhaps not surprising that the impact of the new Precautionary 
Measures bill was modest. Judges still held considerable discretionary power 
to decide whether an individual posed a re-offending or flight risk. They also 
believed, with some justification, that the executive branch had not put in 
place the infrastructure for these new measures, for example electronic 
monitoring. This had also been their reasoning behind resistance to applying 
non-custodial sentences made available to them by laws passed in 1998 and 
2007. Members of the Criminal Justice Network set about evaluating the 
actual impact. A study in Rio de Janeiro showed that before the law, judges 
remanded into custody in 83.8 per cent of cases: this dropped only slightly to 
72.3 per cent in the six months after the passage of the law (Lemgruber et al 
2013: 12). A study conducted in São Paulo in 2014 confirmed the continued 
                                                 
7 http://www.cnj.jus.br/sistema-carcerario-e-execucao-penal/pj-mutirao-
carcerario.  
default position of judges: one quarter of the 410 prisoners in the remand 
centre were released after review of their cases (IDDD, 2016a).  
 
It therefore became clear to the NGOs, and to the CNJ, that further steps 
would be needed to compel judges to use pretrial detention as an exceptional 
measure. The Network realised, through its contact with other human rights 
NGOs and IGOs in Latin America, that Brazil was now the only country in the 
region without a federal law on custody hearings, a mechanism whereby an 
individual arrested in flagrante must be brought speedily before a judge in 
order to determine under what conditions they should await trial. This meant 
that Brazil was not compliant with Article 7.5. of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights. In 2011 the network therefore identified a 
relevant bill in the Senate; although very limited in scope, the bill provided a 
useful rallying point, as custody hearings would both identify police brutality 
and reduce pressure on remand centres. The IDDD and CNJ together drafted 
amendments to it and from 2011-14 the Network lobbied legislators to get it 
approved. However, it took four years to get through the committee stage, and 
was stalled by the counter-lobbying of police, judges’ associations, the 
prosecution service, and ‘tough-on-crime’ legislators. 
 
Meanwhile, the prison authorities in the State of São Paulo were desperate to 
stem the inflow of new prisoners into the system, and in 2014 approached 
IDDD to carry out a standard ‘mutirão carcerário’, The IDDD and CNJ decided 
that a better response would be to block the pipeline. With the bill stuck in 
Congress, the new President of the Supreme Federal Court and of the CNJ, 
Ricardo Lewandowski, used the latter’s own institutional powers to trial 
custody hearings (audiências de custódia) in São Paulo. Initiated in February 
2015 in a mega-complex of courts handling all of the city’s criminal cases, the 
project required a judge to see detainees in the presence of a public 
prosecutor and a defence lawyer within 24 hours of their arrest in flagrante in 
order to determine the legality and necessity of pretrial detention, whether 
there were alternatives to remand as provided in the Lei de Medidas 
Cautelares, and whether the prisoner has been tortured or ill-treated in police 
custody. Up until then, police were required only to present the paperwork to 
the judge in this time period, and prisoners often waited months to get their 
first hearing. The IDDD and Chief Justice Lewandowski worked together to 
win over the notoriously conservative judges of the state Court of Appeal: it 
helped that he was from São Paulo and knew many of them personally and 
professionally. Helpfully, IDDD is also staffed by volunteer criminal lawyers 
who trained in the same law faculties as these justice system operators, 
circulated in the same social and professional spheres, and could call on this 
social capital.  
 
Staff from IDDD monitored the custody hearings from the outside, and in April 
2015 entered into a partnership agreement with the CNJ and the Ministry of 
Justice to formally evaluate the pilot project. The project was then rolled out in 
the capital cities of the other 26 states and the federal district. The CNJ 
passed a formal resolution in December 2015, which took effect on 1 
February 2016, requiring all courts in every jurisdiction in the country to 
conduct custody hearings. Although this has faced legal challenge, the CNJ’s 
justification is that it holds a remit to make Brazil’s judicial processes 
compliant with its obligations under regional and international human rights 
treaties. The latter are regarded supralegal and infraconstitutional in Brazil’s 
constitution, and do not require additional legislation to be effective. 
 
The impact was very positive: by June 2016, 93,4000 custody hearings had 
been held, in just under half the suspects released on bail, nearly always 
under some kind of precautionary measure. Moreover, over 5,000 allegations 
of police brutality had been logged. The system had allowed state agencies 
and legal provision to work together, not at odds. The custody hearing centres 
can refer the accused directly to social services, working with the Centres for 
Non-Custodial Sentences and setting up arrangements for electronic 
monitoring and other measures, all of which removes the judges’ room for 
punitive latitude. That said, there is a lot more for the network to do to make 
this as effective as possible in reducing pretrial detention. Each state’s justice 
system is autonomous, entering into separate agreements with the CNJ, and 
producing quite disparate outcomes: the level of post-hearing release ranges 
from 15 per cent to 79 per cent. The custody hearings currently apply only to 
individuals arrested in flagrante rather than to all detainees, such as those 
detained by arrest warrant. Follow-up on police brutality allegations has been 
minimal. Keeping half of arrestees on remand is still much too high and 
appears that judges still make their decision based not on the likelihood of the 
accused interfering with the judicial process, but rather on their personal 
characteristics and history (IDDD 2016b).  
 
INGO, NGO, and governmental partnerships for improving rule of law 
 
This case study has shown how a ‘meta-NGO’, local NGOs and key state 
actors were able to work together effectively to challenge the abuse of pretrial 
detention in Brazil. Heupel (2012) argues that both inter-governmental actors 
and (international) non-government actors share a common analysis of rule of 
law deficits in transitional societies, attributing them to a lack of will among the 
political elite, a lack of capacity among local justice sector actors, a lack of 
knowledge about how to strengthen the rule of law and limited belief in the 
value of the latter. The OSJI’s strategy succeeded because of its non-
hierarchical relations with partners and lack of conditionality, as it directed 
significant funding at local NGOs already engaged in justice issues. It thus 
overcame two key challenges that face IGOs in promoting rule of law. The 
first is often a lack of solid knowledge to devise effective strategies, but here 
the local NGO network could produce extensive data on both the deficits, and 
the impact of new practices. Secondly, justice reform often forgets the 
participation and empowerment of local actors, but the Criminal Justice 
Network in Brazil continued actively pushing forward pretrial detention reform 
after the OSJI funding for the Global Campaign ceased in 2014, with ongoing 
funding from both OSI and the new state partner. 
  
The OSI and OSJI were also able to act as effective policy entrepreneurs by 
deploying the four styles of translating research into policy identified by Stone 
and Maxwell (2005, 7-8). Firstly, as a ‘storyteller’ the partnership created a 
new policy narrative, recast remand custody as an issue of good governance, 
public health, human rights, and economic development. Secondly, as a 
‘networker’ it developed and participated in an epistemic and policy 
community, the Criminal Justice Network, which built interpersonal trust, 
social capital, and shared commitment to exchange ideas, produce and 
disseminate research and pilot, evaluate, and transfer new policy approaches. 
The network acted as researcher-as-fixer, getting the ear of the right higher-
level lawmakers or policy-makers, in the Ministry of Justice, and in the 
Supreme Court and CNJ. The network’s relations with the CNJ also enabled it 
to deploy researchers-as-engineers’ to work with ‘street-level bureaucrats’, 
that is those who would actually implement the policy, in this case, the judges.  
 
There was also an important regional dimension to this endeavour: the OSJI 
set about building a regional network as well as the start, drawing on data and 
pilot projects in Mexico. Additionally, the Inter-American system played an 
important role: the Inter-American Commission, which had worked incidentally 
on imprisonment, turned its full beam onto pretrial detention with the election 
of role James Cavallaro as Commissioner to the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission in June 2013, with a specific remit for detention. His 
career as law professor at Harvard and Stanford followed his work with 
Human Rights Watch and Global Justice, and he was well connected to the 
Brazilian human rights and legal reform community. IACHR’s first major report 
specifically on pretrial detention was issued that same year. It also played a 
legitimating role, as the CNJ and NGO network were able to invoke the need 
to comply with the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, whilst Chief 
Justice Ricardo Lewandowski insisted on presenting the findings from the first 
six months of the Custody Hearings roll-out to a meeting of the IACHR in 
October 2015.  
 
FINAL COMMENTS 
 
As has been demonstrated, NGOs can play important roles in strengthening 
the rule of law where the state has either signalled its indifference to existing 
problems, or acts to exacerbate them. In this particular case, the branch of 
government expected to exercise the most oversight over government policy 
and over the protection of rights and due process was not only failing to do so, 
but compounding the problem through the discretionary, and illegal, actions of 
its members. For some time, NGOs had been trying to act as checks and 
balances in regard to the abuses in the prison system, but until 2010 could 
only take their concerns to the international system as an echo-chamber to 
exert reputational pressure on the government. Keck and Sikkink’s 
boomerang theory breaks down, however, when the state turns out to be 
unresponsive to such external opprobrium. Thus, the NGOs in this case 
needed a catalyst and funder, in OSJI, and strategic allies in the state, which 
emerged under a government that strengthened the mechanisms of judicial 
oversight in the form of the CNJ and made the Ministry of Justice take justice 
reform seriously. On their own, NGOs could not exert effective controls as 
representatives of private citizens: when the state closes the door to them 
they are ineffective. The state may also try to close the door to them when 
they are effective: criminal justice actors involved in security and crime policy 
rarely invite public scrutiny. They also cannot – and should not, strategically – 
substitute for the state. Sometimes, NGOs find their greater advantage in 
identifying the opportunities for leverage and co-operation that exist in the 
diverse institutional spaces, locally or nationally. At others, however, stepping 
out of the logic of the state by breaking the law through symbolic action has a 
greater pedagogic value in terms of public perception of state violations. 
Whichever strategy they use, as the Latin American experience clearly shows, 
NGOs can be key, flexible, networked and morally compelling actors for the 
improvement of the rule of law. 
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